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RECENT DECISIONS
dence of that conversation would also be admitted. In reaching this deci-
sion, the Court never discussed the sixth amendment implications.
Considering the Lopez fact situation, it would appear that when the
agent returned to record the petitioner's statements, the investigation
was no longer a general inquiry and the petitioner was actually, although
not formally, the "accused," thus rendering the recording inadmissible
under the Massiah-Escobedo rule. Lopez was not mentioned in A.assiah
or Escobedo, although on its face, the reasoning behind the Massiah-
Escobedo rule impliedly overrules Lopez, unless the Court makes the
distinction between a statement which admits a past crime and a state-
ment which is made during the commission of a crime. A possible reason
for such a distinction is that the Court would feel that a person might be
forced or tricked into admitting a past crime, whereas no coercion would
be involved in merely recording the statements made while the criminal
act is taking place.
Many questions are yet unanswered. Has an investigation "focused"
on the accused as soon as he is picked up for questioning? Must he be
advised of his right to counsel? Must counsel be appointed during inter-
rogation if the accused is indigent? In time, the answers will be provided
by the Court on a case-by-case basis.
LARRY L. JESKE
Evidence: Admission of Third Party's Declaration Against Penal
Interest-The defendant was arrested and convicted of possessing
heroin in violation of California law. The lower court refused to per-
mit a police officer called by the state to testify on cross-examination
that the defendant's companion had admitted to the officer that heroin
which the defendant was charged with possessing actually belonged to
her. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that the police officer should
have been allowed to answer the question, contending that the hearsay
rule does not preclude admission of a declaration against penal interest.
The state's argument was that the traditional rule only admits those
declarations which are against the pecuniary or proprietary interests of
the declarant. Further, the state contended that there was no showing
that the declarant was unavailable to testify as to the matters involved.
The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Spriggs,1 held in favor
of the defendant and ordered a new trial.
The English Sussex Peerage case,2 decided in 1844, constitutes the
first expression of the rule that a declaration of a third party against
his penal interest is not admissible. Wigmore calls this case a "backward
step and an arbitrary limit put upon the [hearsay] rule."3
136 Cal. Rptr. 841, 389 P. 2d 377 (1964).
2 11 Cl. & F. 109 (1844), where the declarations of a clergyman that he had per-
formed a marriage which would subject him to a prosecution were rejected.
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1476 (3d ed. 1940).
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The hearsay rule basically signifies "a rule rejecting assertions
offered testimonially which have not been in some way subjected to the
test of cross-examination." 4 However, there have developed certain
exceptions to this rule; to wit: (1) to show state of mind of the declar-
ant, both at the time of and before the declaration; (2) to establish future
conduct of the declarant; (3) to show past knowledge of the declarant;
(4) to show spontaneous or excited utterances regardless of their con-
temporaneousness with a "transaction in issue" (i.e., as part of the res
gestae) ; (5) to show pain or suffering. 5 A further exception to the hear-
say rule allows the admission of declarations of third parties which are
against their interest. This exception is based upon the principle that
one will not assert a fact directly against one's interest which is deliber-
ately false or incorrect and hence that such statement is worthy of belief
although there has been no oath or cross-examination.6 However, this
exception is almost unanimously limited to declarations which are
against proprietary or pecuniary interests of the declarant and does not
include declarations against penal or social interests.
In the Spriggs case, the California court adopted the minority rule
and the position of Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in the case of Donnelly
v. United States.7 Jones, in his work on evidence stated that "in criminal
actions most courts have consistently adhered to the rule excluding con-
fessions of others which tend to exculpate another person who is charged
with the offense and the rule is generally applied in civil actions."8
The decision in Spriggs is not wholly without support, however, and
"there is substantial recent authority for admitting in evidence confes-
sions and declarations which are shown to have been against the penal
4 Id. §1362.
5 People v. Spriggs, supra note 1, at 844, 389 P. 2d at 380.
6 WIG 0PE, op. cit. supra note 3, §1457.
7 228 U.S. 243 (1913). The opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes is as follows: "The
confession of Joe Dick, since deceased, that he committed the murder for
which the plaintiff in error was tried, coupled with circumstances pointing to its
truth, would have a very strong tendency to make anyone outside of a court of
justice believe that Donnelly did not commit the crime. I say this, of course,
on the supposition that it should be proved that the confession really was made,
and that there was no ground for connecting Donnelly with Dick. The rules
of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic and common sense, less
hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There is no decision
by this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases
since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the
hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well known; no
other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder, it is far
more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to
hang a man... ; and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards,
some of which seem to me excessive, I think we ought to give him the benefit
of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the
law and the arguments against the English doctrine are so well and fully stated
by Mr. Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth at greater length." Id.
at 277-78.
8 JoNEs, EVIDENCE §296 (5th ed. 1958).
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interest of the declarant." The case of Hines v. Commonwealth0 is one
of the first in which the court departed from the traditional rule. In that
case, Hines was ultimately found guilty of the murder of a police officer,
but the appellate court did rule that the subsequent confession of a third
party declarant that he, the third party, committed the murder should
be admitted. The court in Hines was careful, however, to limit its deci-
sion to the particular case where there were other facts of motive and
conduct of the third party which were material circumstances supporting
the confession. This decision was followed by Newberry v. Common-
wealth."
Other states recognizing third party declarations against penal inter-
est include: Missouri, where in Sutter v. Easterly2 an affidavit that
declarant had engaged in fraudulent, shameful, and criminal conspiracy
culminating in perjury was admissible; Maryland, where in a bastardy
case in which the third party, who had associated with prosecutrix, be-
fore committing suicide admitted that he was the father of the child, the
court in light of the surrounding circumstances allowed the letters of ad-
mission to be introduced ;13 and Illinois, where the court allowed a third
party declaration of the commission of the crime for which the defend-
ant was tried, when the defendant had been convicted solely on the basis
of a confession, the voluntariness of which was seriously questioned. 14
Minnesota, in a note to In re Forsythe's Estate, 5 pointed favorably to
the modem tendency to hold that the interest element need not be pro-
prietary or pecuniary.
The majority opinion in the Donnelly case'" presents the present view
of the federal courts, although in the case of United States v. Annunzi-
ato 7 the position was referred to as a "rather indefensible limitation.""8
Dictum in Truelsch v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.'9 indicates that
Wisconsin would follow the majority rule, although the particular case
did not involve a declaration against penal interest, but rather a declara-
tion against pecuniary or proprietary interest.
Justice Traynor points out in the Spriggs case that a declaration
against penal interest is no less trustworthy than a declaration against
pecuniary or proprietary interest. This is also the view advanced by
9 Ibid.
10 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
11191 Va. 445, 61 S.E. 2d 318 (1952).
12 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W. 2d 284 (1945).
13 Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 118, 134 AtI. 148 (1926).
14 People v. Lettrich, 413 Il1. 172, 108 N.E. 2d 488 (1952).
15 221 Minn. 303, 22 N.W. 2d 19 (1946).
16 Donnelly v. United States, supra note 7.
17293 F. 2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 373 (1961).
is Id., 293 F. 2d at 378.
19 186 Wis. 239, 248, 202 N.W. 352, 356 (1925) : "Mr. Wigmore vigorously argues
that the exception should be so extended as to include confessions of crime or
other statements of facts against penal interest .... But, as he concedes, this
view has not been generally accepted."
19641
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
McCormick.20 Wigmore states that the only plausible policy reason that
has been advanced for this limitation is the possibility of procuring
fabricated testimony to such an admission if oral.21 As the cases and
authorities have maintained, however, if the surrounding circumstances
support the declaration, there is no reason to consider a declaration against
penal interest less trustworthy than a declaration against pecuniary or
proprietary interest.
If a charge involving the life or liberty of a citizen, and depending
solely upon circumstantial evidence, cannot stand the test of
allowing the jury to determine from the testimony whether a
third party has in fact confessed guilt, and if so whether such con-
fession was true, a conviction ought not to follow. 22
The second issue in the Spriggs case involved the availability of the
declarant to testify. From the record, Justice Traynor states that there
was no showing whether or not she was available. The court felt that
had Mrs. Roland, the declarant, taken the witness stand and denied pos-
session of narcotics, her out-of-court declaration against interest would
have been admissible to prove the truth of the matter stated, 23 as well as
to impeach her by a prior inconsistent statement.
A witness is considered unavailable if he is dead, insane, or outside
the jurisdiction of the court. It has also been held that one who has re-
fused to testify because his testimony might incriminate him is con-
sidered unavailable as a witness, just as though he were beyond the
reaches of the court or had since died.24 Hence, had Mrs. Roland been
unavailable, Justice Traynor states, there would have been a necessity
for her declaration, thus affording another basis for its admissibility in
addition to the trustworthy character of the evidence.
The decision in Spriggs seems to be a step forward in the abandon-
ment of an illogical rule of evidence. The admissibility of the declara-
tion against penal interest should be determined in light of the principle
that "the purpose of all rules of evidence is to aid in arriving at the
truth, and if it should appear that any rule tends rather to hinder than
facilitate this result . . . it should be abrogated without hesitation.' 12"
However, the courts have been and should remain cautious in allow-
ing only those declarations against penal interest to be admitted which
20 cCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §255 (1954).
21 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 3, §1477
"-Hines v. Commonwealth, supra note 10, 117 S.E. at 846.
23 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, §1792, states: "Statements offered as self-con-
tradictions are admitted not as assertions to be credited, but merely as consti-
tuting an inconsistency which indicates the witness to be in error in one or the
other statement; their use as hearsay assertions is uniformly prohibited by the
Courts." The cases cited by the California court point to their position here as
a minority view which is further supported by McCormick and UNIFORM
RuLE o EVIDENCE 63 (10).
24 Newberry v. Commonwealth, supra note 11, 61 S.E. 2d at 326.
-5 Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 649, 151 Pac. 1, 8 (1915).
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are supported by corroborating circumstances, in order that the oppor-
tunity to perpetrate fraud upon the courts shall not be presented.
COLLEEN A. ROACH
Partnership: The Concept of the "Continuing Partnership"-
The recent Wisconsin case of Adams v. Jarvis' involved a three-man
medical partnership at will, governed by a formal and detailed partner-
ship agreement. Under the rather unique contract, the partnership was
not to terminate at the withdrawal or death of a partner. Instead, until
a full settlement was made in accordance with the agreement, the with-
drawing partner or the deceased partner's estate would continue to
participate in partnership profits and losses, but not in the management
of the clinic. A retiring partner would receive any balance standing to
his credit on the books of the partnership, the amount of his capital
account, and that proportion of profits to which he was entitled pursu-
ant to the agreement. It was specifically agreed that on the withdrawal
of any partner the accounts receivable were to remain the property of
the clinic. The books of the firm were not to close until the end of the
fiscal year.
On May 8, 1961, the plaintiff submitted a letter to the partnership
giving notice of withdrawal, declaring the partnership dissolved, and
requesting an accounting. The plaintiff terminated his association with
the firm on June 1. The remaining partners carried on the business of
the firm and refused, by virtue of the agreement, to pay any portion of
the accounts receivable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action
for a declaratory judgment in the county court, urging that the partner-
ship was dissolved upon his withdrawal and that partnership property,
including accounts receivable, be divided equally among the three part-
ners. The plaintiff reasoned that if the partnership dissolved upon with-
drawal, the retiring partner's rights should be determined pursuant to
section 123.372 of the Wisconsin statutes, and the partnership affairs
123 Wis. 2d 453, 127 N.W. 2d 400 (1964). Relevant portions of the partnership
contract were quoted by the court.
2 "Rights of retiring or deceased partner. When any partner retires or dies, and
the business is continued under any of the conditions set forth in [section]
123.36(1), (2), (3), (5) and (6) or [section] 123.33(2) (b), without any settle-
ment of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or partnership
continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representative
as against such persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the
date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an
amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with in-
terest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal representative, in lieu of
interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property of the
dissolved partnership; provided that the creditors of the dissolved partnership
as against the separate creditors, or the representative of the retired or de-
ceased partner, shall have priority on any claim arising under this section, as
provided by [section] 123.36 (8)."
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